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KAREN STEVENSON and STATE FARM 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
No- 940037-CA 
Appellees. Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, 
JERRY STEVENSON 
Appellant, Jerry Stevenson, respectfully submits his Reply 
Brief in these appeal proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT JERRY STEVENSON HAS PRODUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
UNDER THE INDIVISIBLE INJURY RULE TO SUBMIT HIS CASE TO A JURY. 
In her Brief, appellee Karen Stevenson, contends that Jerry 
Stevenson has not met his burden of proof under the indivisible 
injury rule. In support of her contention, appellee cites Petersen 
v. Parry, 448 P.2d 653, 659 (Idaho 1968) which is said to stand for 
the following proposition: 
Therefore, defendants are jointly and 
severally liable for a plaintiff's injuries 
under the Rule only when the plaintiff is able 
to prove that each defendant proximately 
caused some injury to Plaintiff. (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 8)(emphasis original). 
This ignores a key element of the indivisible injury rule. 
Not only does the rule serve to hold tortfeasors jointly and 
severally liable for indivisible harm, it also reduces or shifts 
the burden of proof the plaintiff must meet on the issue of 
proximate causation. This aspect of the rule is recognized in 
Washewich v. LeFave, 248 So.2d 670, 672 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1971)(emphasis added) where the court stated "the burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove to the extent reasonably possible what injuries 
were proximately caused by each of the two accidents." See also 
Annot., Apportionment of Damages Involving Successive Impacts by 
Different Motor Vehicles, 100 A.L.R.2d 16, 59; Section 9 
(specifically addressing case law "shifting or relaxing burden of 
proof as to causation")(1965). 
Furthermore, Petersen v. Parry, 448 P.2d 653, 659 (Idaho 1968) 
does not support appellee's position. In Petersen, two vehicles 
collided head-on on a two lane highway in Idaho. The parents of a 
child killed in the collision brought a wrongful death suit against 
both deceased drivers. There were no survivors from the accident. 
Because there were no survivors, the facts were limited. The two 
vehicles were travelling 60 miles per hour when the second car (car 
#2) was substantially in the oncoming lane. The first car (car 
#1), presumably in an attempt to avoid the oncoming car, skidded 
and unfortunately also drifted slightly into the oncoming lane. 
The result was a head-on collision which killed all involved. 
There was no indication that car #2 took any evasive action. Suit 
was brought against both drivers. 
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Relevant to the instant case is the court's limited discussion 
of proximate cause in the context of the suit against car #1. 
Petersen, 448 P.2d at 659. The plaintiff sought to submit the case 
based on Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). The court 
restated the single injury rule, but declined to apply it in the 
Petersen case because, lf[a]s previously noted in this opinion, the 
evidence at hand is insufficient to support a finding of negligence 
on the part of Rl herein. Therefore, . . . Tice [is] 
inapplicable." Id. The court had noted previously that there was 
no indication that the driver of car #1 had in any way acted 
negligently. Id. at 657-58. In addition, plaintiff's expert could 
not testify as to what caused the accident, as opposed to the 
instant case, where there is no dispute about what caused the 
accident. Id. at 658. Here, the dispute is whether the accident 
caused plaintiff's injury. Appellee's reliance on Petersen 
reveals a misunderstanding of the indivisible injury rule. A 
central aspect of the rule is the reduction or shifting of burden 
of proof on the element of proximate cause. Another aspect of the 
rule is the imposition of joint and several liability. Appellee 
simply ignores that fundamental aspect of the indivisible injury 
rule which reduces or shifts the burden of proof on proximate 
cause. Instead she argues that before joint and several liability 
may be imposed a plaintiff must still prove that defendant's 
negligence was the proximate cause. This argument sidesteps the 
fact that the rule not only reduces or shifts the burden of proof 
on the element of proximate cause, but also may impose joint and 
- 3 -
several liability. 
Appellee misstates appellant's position on page 11, n.3 of her 
brief, where it is stated that fl[p]laintiff states that other 
jurisdictions have allowed indivisible injury rule cases to go to 
a jury even though the element of proximate cause is missing." 
First, this is not an accurate reflection of the position taken by 
appellant. It is appellant's position that other jurisdictions, 
under the indivisible injury rule, have either shifted or relaxed 
the burden of proof on the element of proximate causation. A 
relaxed standard of proof on the issue of proximate causation does 
not constitute, as appellee's suggest, the complete absence of the 
element of proximate cause. See appellant's brief, p. 7 ("Further, 
while allowing the issue of proximate cause to go before a jury on 
a showing of possibility is a departure from traditional Utah law, 
other jurisdictions have allowed such cases to go before a jury 
under the single injury rule."). Cases cited in Section I.A. of 
appellant's brief support this position. Washewich v. LeFave, 248 
So. 2d 670, 672 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971) (element of proximate cause 
"somewhat relaxed . . . where the evidence indicates that the 
defendant's negligence has proximately resulted in an aggravation 
of a pre-existing injury . . .) . Since these courts allow the 
submission of plaintiff's case under a relaxed standard of 
causation, the only other standards left is either a showing of 
possibility or entirely shifting the burden to disprove causation 
to the tortfeasors. This was the entire purpose for the creation 
of the indivisible injury rule, to allow plaintiffs to escape the 
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harsh results of traditional standards of causation where "the 
plaintiff cannot carry the impossible burden of proving the 
respective shares of causation." Holtz v. Holder, 418 P.2d 584, 
588 (1966). Further, William L. Prosser, Law of Torts (Fourth 
Edition), states: 
There is one special type of situation in 
which the usual rule that the burden of proof 
as to causation is on the plaintiff has been 
relaxed. It may be called that of clearly 
established double fault and alternative 
liability. 
[T]he California supreme court has solved the 
problem by placing the burden of proof on the 
issue of causation upon the two defendants. 
There is support for this in . . . American 
automobile cases of "chain collisions/1 in 
which the plaintiff is injured by one or two 
more negligently driven cars, but cannot prove 
which. It seems a very desirable solution 
where negligence on the part of both 
defendants is clear, and it is only the issue 
of causation which is in doubt, so the choice 
must be made between letting the loss due to 
failure of proof fall upon the innocent 
plaintiff or the culpable defendants. 
(Prosser, p.243). 
Appellant Jerry Stevenson cannot prove to a "reasonable degree 
of medical probability" what damage the second impact caused. This 
is because the accident occurred a few seconds of each other. It 
is simply impossible to apportion out which collision caused or 
aggravated Jerry Stevenson's injuries. This situation is entirely 
the result of defendants/ tortious conduct. Therefore, equity is 
on the side of relaxing Jerry Stevenson's burden of proof on the 
issue of proximate causation in this narrow and limited context. 
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II. THE INDIVISIBLE INJURY RULE IS CONSISTENT WITH 
COMPARATIVE FAULT PRINCIPLES. 
On page 12 of appellee's brief, it is suggested that "the Utah 
legislature has deliberated the issue and has clearly rejected the 
concept of joint and several liability." However, there is no 
evidence which suggests that the legislature considered a situation 
where multiple tortfeasors, either in concert or rapid succession, 
produce one single indivisible injury. The impossibility of 
apportionment of fault under appellee7s analysis would result in a 
complete absence of liability for tortfeasors fortunate enough to 
have committed their torts simultaneously or nearly simultaneously 
with other tortfeasors. This is an unjust result and does not 
appear to have been intended by the legislature. Comparative fault 
principles solely apply where apportionment is possible. However, 
where proof of causation is impossible because of the conduct of 
the defendants, comparative fault principles ought not to apply. 
In the alternative, Section 78-27-40, Utah Code Annotated 
states directly that a defendant is only liable for "that 
percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant." 
The language of the statute directs comparison by way of fault, not 
causation. Therefore, the single indivisible injury rule can still 
be applied in the context of a comparative fault system. The 
appellee, Karen Stevenson, would be entitled to have the other 
tortfeasors on the jury verdict form and could argue that the other 
tortfeasors were also at fault. The indivisible injury rule has 
two separate and distinct aspects; first, it allows the imposition 
of joint and several liability, and second, it reduces or shifts 
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the burden of proof of the plaintiff on the element of proximate 
cause. This Court may fashion a rule which, in recognition of the 
equities involved in multiple collision cases, allows a reduction 
in a plaintiff's burden on the issue of proximate causation yet 
denies joint and several liability consistent with Utah's 
comparative fault system. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Jerry Stevenson asks this Court to reverse Judge 
Glasmann's ruling and remand this case thereby allowing Jerry 
Stevenson to present his case to a jury. 
DATED this J2^ day of JHfirt , 1994. t 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
PATRICK F. HOLDEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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